From FP, Stephen M. Walt writes:
Which sparked the following question: why is the United
States getting hot and bothered about the events in Mali (troubling though they
are), while the problems caused by the violent drug organizations in Mexico fly
mostly below the radar? As I learned at
yesterday's seminar, the drug war in Mexico was never mentioned during the
presidential debates, even though over 60,000 Mexicans have been murdered over
the past six years and even though this violence has killed several hundred
Americans in recent years too. Prominent
senators like John McCain keep harping about violence in Syria and the need for
greater U.S. involvement; why doesn't violence that is closer to home and that
affects Americans more directly get equal or greater attention? To say nothing of the effects that Mexican
meth and other drugs have on the United States itself.
It's a serious question: why do some fairly distant and
minor threats get lots of play in our discourse and command big-ticket policy
responses, while more imminent threats get downplayed? Here are some possible reasons.
First, direct and deliberate
threats to attack the U.S. or Americans abroad generate more attention than
threats that might kill even more people inadvertently. Groups
like al Qaeda deliberately target
Americans (and others); by contrast, drug gangs mostly want to make
money and
the harm they do to others is a by-product of their criminal activities.
You know: it's just business. An understandable, if not entirely
rational, reason to see them as less threatening.
A corollary reason is the fear of "Islamism"
and the impact of the al Qaeda brand. We wouldn't be nearly as worried
about "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb"
if it had stuck to its original name ("the Salafist Group for Preaching
and
Combat"). No matter what your actual agenda is, putting on the al Qaeda
label is a good way to guarantee you get a lot of attention from Uncle
Sam.
Second, we are more likely to respond to threats when we
think there is a simple, cheap, and obvious military response. This is
partly because the U.S. military is
well-funded, omnipresent, and good at blowing things up, which gives
presidents more confidence that they might actually accomplish something
they can brag about later. By contrast, we ignore or downplay problems
when we know in advance that we don't know how to fix them. Trying to
address the drug violence in
Mexico in a serious way would require the United States to do more to
reduce
our society's appetite for drugs, or make the trade less lucrative by
decriminalizing it (ok for pot, big problem for meth). And we can't just
subcontract the response to
the military, because our relationship with Mexico also involves lots of
other
agencies (State, Justice, INS, DHS, etc., etc.). If you're a politician
and you don't have any answers, you won't bring up the issue yourself
and you'll hope to God that nobody else does either.
Third, some threats get attention because somebody has done
a good job of marketing on their behalf. I get several unsolicited emails a day from various Syrian rebel groups,
each of them providing information designed to encourage greater U.S.
participation. This is of course
nothing new: the government of Kuwait hired a PR firm to make the case for U.S.
action in the first Gulf War, and the British government waged an aggressive
propaganda campaign to foster U.S. involvement in World War I. Threat assessment is never as apolitical as
the Ideal Strategist would like; sometimes it comes down to which side has
better threat-mongerers.
Fourth, we hyper-ventilate over Mali and downplay Mexico because the latter is close by and we have lot of
positive relations there that could get disrupted if we went all-out after the
drug lords. Sending drones and special
forces into places like Yemen or Mali doesn't threaten a lot of other vital relations
with those countries (e.g., US trade with Yemen in 2012 was only $500
million), but interfering in Mexico could jeopardize our $450 billion-plus trade relationship and cause other political problems, especially given the
prior history of U.S. interference there.
All of which reminds us that there's a big error term in how
great powers (and especially the United States) identify and prioritize threats. We'd like to think it was based on rational
assessment of cost, benefits, risks, and opportunities, but that seems to be
true only in the most crude sense. U.S.
leaders did (eventually) recognize the geopolitical threats posed by Wilhelmine
and Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union, just as we now worry about
what a rising China might portend for the future. But at the margin, our ability to prioritize
lesser threats properly is pretty paltry. How else to explain why we get in a lather when North Korea tests a
missile -- something we've done hundreds of times -- while downplaying more immediate problems much closer to home?