From Boston Review regarding Argentina's plight with its recent past:
From 1976 to 1983, Argentina was ruled by the most repressive
dictatorship any South American country has ever endured, and the Dirty
War was its clandestine campaign against “subversion.” Official
government reports estimate that some 14,000 people were “disappeared”
in this campaign: kidnapped by the military, held in secret detention
centers, tortured, and, typically, murdered. The junta never
acknowledged any illegal activity. Almost no records of the campaign
survive.
The subsequent twenty-five-year effort to bring
perpetrators to justice reveals a painful discord between the impulse
to punish past wrongs and the goal of fostering a democratic community,
a tension that afflicts all countries after periods of authoritarian
rule. In Argentina the justice-seeking began almost immediately after
the military regime collapsed amid a slumping economy and a disastrous
attempt to reclaim the disputed Malvinas/Falkland Islands from the
British. Raúl Alfonsín, the first democratically elected president
after the junta’s fall, made history when his government indicted the
leading members of the military dictatorship. In the 1985 trial of the
junta, five of Argentina’s nine ruling commanders, including General
Jorge Videla (the junta’s first de facto president) and Admiral Emilio
Massera (the Navy’s ex-commander-in-chief and co-architect of the 1976
coup), were convicted of human rights abuses. The trial revealed the
systematic horrors unleashed by the military government, forced
Argentines to reflect on the roots of their authoritarian past, and
forged a collective witness to ensure that such horrors would never
happen again.
But as indictments reached down the chain of
command, an anxious military strongly asserted its opposition to
further prosecution. Under the threat of another coup—the military had
overthrown Argentina’s constitutional government six times in the
twentieth century and often played a central role in politics, even if
not formally in power—Alfonsín pushed the Full Stop law through
congress in 1986, which left only sixty days for new indictments.
Alfonsín hoped only a few dozen would follow, which would ease military
anxiety and solidify democratic transition. Instead, 400 indictments
came in before the deadline. In the days before Easter of 1987,
Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico staged a rebellion at the Campo de Mayo
army base. In response, 400,000 people gathered in the Plaza de Mayo
outside the government house in Buenos Aires. On a tense Easter Sunday,
facing the prospect of bloodshed and civil war, President Alfonsín flew
to Campo de Mayo. Though Alfonsín denies negotiating, the rebellion
ended, and by June the Due Obedience law was passed. Due Obedience
exculpated mid- and low-ranking officials for their involvement in the
disappearances. Together, the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws were a
wide-reaching amnesty, ending all but a few of the 400 prosecutions in
process.
Toward the end of Alfonsín’s tenure, Argentina
was crippled by a hyperinflation reaching levels as high as 2000
percent. Politically unpopular for his perceived capitulation to the
military and his failure to reign in the inflation, Alfonsín was forced
out of office early and succeeded by Carlos Menem in 1989. After
further isolated revolts, Menem issued blanket pardons in 1989 and
1990. Though most Argentines found the pardons unsettling, Menem
recognized that, seven years after the military’s collapse, economic
reform had eclipsed the Dirty War in immediate political importance.
Equally pragmatic and principled, Menem silenced military unrest in
order to protect his presidency and move ahead with economic
privatization.
For years human rights organizations challenged his impunity. The Madres (Mothers) de Plaza de Mayo—who
began their weekly protests at the height of the junta’s
power—continued marching around the Plaza, demanding accountability for
the disappearance of their children. Legal organizations brought
constitutional challenges. But the combined moral and juridical force
of the human rights movement did not prevail. In 1987, the Supreme
Court upheld the amnesty laws, and in 1990—after Menem successfully
packed the court by increasing its membership from five to nine—upheld
the pardons. With the amnesty cemented in law, the transition appeared
over. The mothers marched, but no one listened.
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