An interview in The American Prospect with Rashid Khalidi who holds the Edward Said Chair at the Middle East Institute at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs:
Your book is about the failure of the Palestinians to establish a state in 1948 and ever since. Briefly highlight key points in the history.
The important turning points were the rise of the Nazis and the 1936-1939 [Arab] revolt, and after that, it was pretty much over for the Palestinians. I don't think that you can blame the Palestinians that much after 1939, because they have taken an enormous hit due to British repression -- a huge percentage were killed or imprisoned by the British or, like my uncle, [who was] in the top leadership, sent off to the Seychelles or Malta or Uganda.
Another turning point comes in the 1970s and 1980s, when there is a clear understanding on the part of the PLO leadership that the entire international environment has changed, that the Arab environment has changed, that the whole way that Palestinian aspirations are pitched is out of sync with everything else in the universe -- and they change … I think they probably could have done more to build themselves up as a credible state actor, a para-state actor.
As I say in the book, I think that a huge opportunity was missed in the early 1990s in the wake of the first Gulf War and in the wake of [former Secretary of State James] Baker's opening up the first and only conference [in Madrid] bringing all the parties to the table -- a unique diplomatic achievement in the entire history of the conflict. The Palestinians actually had much more leverage than they realized they had. They were weak due to disastrous, foolish decisions made by Arafat, in terms of aligning the PLO with the Iraqis explicitly or implicitly, and they were weakened in various ways in consequence. But in looking back … Oslo was one of the worst things that they could have done in several respects, in terms of permitting with Palestinian assent the doubling of the settler population in the decade of the 1990s, and in terms of consecrating a much higher level of control over the Palestinian population in the territories.
Is that because the settlements were not put on the table immediately?
Partly … Dennis Ross [a Middle East
advisor in the first Bush White House] saw to it and Baker backed him
up, and it continued through Clinton. The Palestinians weren't allowed
to talk about anything important -- Jerusalem, refugees, settlements
water, borders … sovereignty, statehood. Those were made final status
issues, in the never-never land of the future, which turned out to be a
take-it-or-leave-it offer by the Americans on behalf of [former Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud] Barak in the summer of 2000. These issues were
briefly discussed, and then what happened, happened. This actually had
to do not only with what you suggest -- the architecture, structure
[framework] of Oslo negotiations -- but also with the Americans'
failure to live up to their letter of assurance to the Palestinians,
which had been that during the negotiations nothing that predetermined
or prejudged the outcome was to be allowed … If that stuff is not
stopped in 1992, there is no point in negotiating. What are we
negotiating about?